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Th is essay constructs a comprehensive view of Dewey’s approach to history, the 
historical method, and history education. Drawing on Dewey’s approach to the 
subject at the University of Chicago Laboratory School (1896-1904), Dewey’s chap-
ter on the historical method in Logic: A Th eory of Inquiry (1938), and a critique of 
Dewey’s philosophy of history that appeared in the American Historical Review 
and the published response to this attack by Dewey’s colleagues (1954), the author 
argues that Dewey consistently approached history in genetic and historicist terms.
Recent theory and research in historical education has focused attention on the 
structures, processes, and cognitive acts of professional historians. Proponents of 
historical thinking argue that authentic teaching in history should move beyond the 
mere memorization of facts and instead engage students directly in the interpreta-
tion of primary sources and the construction of original historical accounts. Th ese 
scholars argue that by “doing history” through open-ended inquiry, students will 
discover the contingent nature of historical accounts, which is a more accurate re-
fl ection of the fi eld. In particular, books like Howard Gardner’s Th e Disciplined Mind 
and Keith Barton and Linda Levstik’s Teaching History for the Common Good cite 
the work of John Dewey as a rationale for engaging students in meaningful historical 
inquiry. In light of the recent resurgence of interest in history education, an inves-
tigation of Dewey’s philosophy of history and history education seems warranted.1
In his 1938 book, Logic: Th e Th eory of Inquiry, Dewey devoted an entire chap-
ter, titled “Judgment as Spatial-Temporal Distinction: Narration Description,” to the 
historical method. Th is chapter is most frequently addressed and cited when histo-
rians analyze Dewey’s philosophy of history.2 Th e literature on Dewey’s philosophy 
John Dewey on History Education and the Historical Method    21
Volume 26 (2)  2010
of history focuses on questions of whether or not his pragmatic views of history were 
relativistic, ambivalent, antagonistic, or adequate. For example, judging the effi  cacy 
of Dewey’s theory, Burleigh Taylor Wilkins argues, “Dewey had closed the door to 
any eff ective distinctions between the fi nding of the historian and the reasons that 
lie behind his interest in any historical problem.”3 Wilkins considers epistemological 
dualism, which Dewey rejected, as a necessary precondition for eff ective historical 
inquiry. Likewise, Th omas Neill remarked, “Because Dewey thought of knowledge 
in terms of power rather than truth, he could not understand that historians fre-
quently undertake inquiries without trying to prove anything.”4 Neill criticized 
Dewey’s contention that trained historians could not transcend the social views 
and narrow interests of their time. For both of these critics, Dewey’s philosophy of 
history was inherently relativistic and denied that historians could fully separate 
their understanding of the past from their own social milieus. While these critiques 
may indeed be accurate, they do not approach Dewey from the proper perspective, 
because they both view Dewey’s philosophy of history as something fi xed. How-
ever, Dewey viewed history itself in historicist and genetic terms. History was one 
thing for the elementary school student, another thing for the secondary student, 
and yet another for the professional historian. Dewey believed that the method and 
content of history was itself part of the process of growth.
 In this essay, I suggest that to understand Dewey’s philosophy of history 
fully, we must reconcile the view he put forth in Logic with his earlier views on 
how history was used at the University of Chicago laboratory school (the Dewey 
School, 1896-1904). I openly admit that I am constructing a consistency of views 
that Dewey never fully outlined. He always viewed his own thought in historicist 
terms; his ideas were never intended to be internally consistent, rather, each idea 
was introduced in the context of a particular issue and period. As Dewey admitted 
to a colleague in 1931, “I’ve worked out my views rather piecemeal and not always 
with consistency in detail.”5 I argue that the consistency of Dewey’s thoughts on 
history can, in fact, be found in the piecemeal nature of his career, development, 
and philosophy. Th at is, he was consistent in that he consistently approached knowl-
edge and problems in a historicist manner. Th is approach not only provides a more 
accurate depiction of Dewey’s own thinking, but it better refl ects his views on the 
discipline of history itself.
 My account draws upon three areas of Dewey’s career. First, I demonstrate 
how the cultural and industrial history of the race provided the underlying con-
ceptual framework for the curriculum at the Dewey School (1896-1904). Next I 
outline Dewey’s views on the historical method as presented in Logic: A Th eory of 
Inquiry (1938). Finally, I focus on a critique of Dewey’s philosophy of history that 
appeared in the American Historical Review—the fl agship journal of the Ameri-
can Historical Association— in 1954 and the published response to this attack by 
Dewey’s colleagues. Drawing on these three sources, I construct a comprehensive 
view of Dewey’s approach to history and history education.
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History as Form and Content 
Dewey viewed the discipline of history in historicist and genetic terms. By this I 
mean that he considered the modern discipline of history a product of the histori-
cal development of the race itself, which he believed corresponded with the devel-
opment of the child and adult.  Th e past existed independent of cognition, but it 
only took on value and meaning when it was put to a particular use or framed in 
a particular narrative in the present. As a historicist, Dewey related all knowledge 
to prior knowledge, and as a genetic psychologist, he considered any historical as-
sertion as having incorporative contextual meanings organized through distinct 
stages of consciousness. So, history did not have a single static meaning. Instead 
its meaning evolved as the race progressed, and, accordingly, its meaning evolved 
for an individual as she or he relived the history of the race.  For Dewey, to under-
stand any piece of knowledge and its relationship to an individual or society, one 
had to understand its history.  Like many of his contemporaries, Dewey agreed that 
a theory of historical change was the key to understanding the present: “Th e great 
sciences of the present century have been the historical and social sciences, taken 
from a historical point of view.”6  Likewise history was the key to conceptualizing 
the scope and sequence of the curriculum. As Dewey explained: “Th e problem of 
education—the problem of establishing vital connections between the immature 
child and the cultural and technical achievements of the adult life . . . continually 
increases in diffi  culty. It is coming to be recognized that the historical method, 
more than any one thing is the key which unlocks diffi  culties.”7 Dewey viewed the 
past, organized around a narrative of social and intellectual progress, as the orga-
nizational scheme for his entire curriculum at the University of Chicago labora-
tory school.  So, in this basic sense he was clearly not antagonistic toward history. 
However, he argued that teachers should only present those facts that presented 
insight into present life. His selection criteria for historical facts to include in the 
curriculum was self-consciously teleological and presentist. But, history for Dewey 
was a circuit, because the historical facts that were so crucial to his “reliving the race 
experience” curriculum were the products of professional historians, sociologists, 
and anthropologists, who were themselves the products of the latest stage of the race 
experience. So historical facts had two components, what Dewey called “content” 
and “form” values. As Dewey explained, the study of history should “introduce the 
child to a consciousness of the makeup or structure of social life,” as well as give 
him “command over, the instrumentalities through which the society carries it-
self along . . . Th e former is the content value and the latter is the form value.” Th e 
content of history (i.e., the facts) determined the form of history, but the form of 
history (i.e., method) produced the content. Th at is, through a study of the content 
of history, students learned how and why the historical method (form) had come 
about, but the content of history about which these students learned was itself the 
product of the historical method—both sides of the circuit needed to be taught si-
multaneously. As Dewey explained, “Studies cannot be classifi ed into form studies 
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and content studies. Everything has both sides.”8 To address both sides of history, 
Dewey insisted that teachers should not approach the content of history as static, 
predetermined facts, but rather as a set of simplifi ed, unraveling processes involv-
ing concrete problems and tools corresponding with the development of the race, 
which aligned with the developmental stages of the child. Th us, the history of the 
race dictated the selection of “content,” and the developmental level of the child dic-
tated the appropriate “form” the content took, as the latter recapitulated the former.9
Th e Dewey School curriculum was organized as a carefully selected reenacted 
history of the human race. Regarding the selection of content, Dewey explained 
that the “type phases of historical development may be selected which will exhibit 
as through a telescope, the essential constituents of the existing order.” Regarding 
the organization of this content, Dewey insisted that “a study of still simpler forms 
of hunting, nomadic and agricultural life in the beginnings of civilization; a study 
of the eff ects of the introduction of iron, iron tools, and so forth, serves to reduce 
the existing complexity to its simple forms.” Th e idea was that the historical content 
presented to students would not be historical as such, but rather would be presented 
as immediate problems, which also happened to have historical signifi cance. Aft er 
students had mastered the corresponding form and content for each stage, they 
would eventually arrive at the modern stage, which included the introduction of 
the techniques of the professional historian— the stage that included inquiry for 
an expert audience.  However, students would only appreciate the techniques of the 
historian if they were viewed as a natural progression from prior social forms. “With 
increasing mental maturity, and corresponding specialization which naturally ac-
companies it,” Dewey explained, “these various instrumentalities may become ends 
in themselves.” Th e study of history as its own end—as an abstract means of under-
standing and appreciating the value of the past—was a product of the fi nal stage of 
development. Living through (or experiencing) the history of the race represented 
the key to appreciating the “organic relationship to real ends and values” inherent 
in the fi nal stage. However, Dewey insisted that the content and form of this fi nal 
stage should not be taught directly during prior stages. Instead, this appreciation 
could only take place aft er previous stages had been “adequately lived through.”10
The Stages of Consciousness and Growth 
Th e stages that a child progressed through were products of the biological and social 
inheritance, but they began with the biological. As Dewey explained, “all conduct 
springs ultimately and radically out of native instincts and impulses.” Th erefore, 
teachers needed to “know what these instincts and impulses were in order to know 
what to appeal to and what to build upon.” All historical content was “empty . . . until 
it is made over into terms of the individual’s own activities, habits and desires.”11 For 
most readers, School and Society presents the fullest description of Dewey’s stages 
and how he coordinated race activities to each epoch.12  “Many anthropologists have 
told us there are certain identities in the child’s interests with those of primitive life,” 
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Dewey explained in this widely read text, “Th ere is a sort of natural recurrence of 
the child mind to the typical activities of primitive peoples.”13 Th us he established 
the recapitulational link between development of the individual and race, which 
had been outlined by many leading anthropologists and psychologists of the period.
School and Society related how, through the coordination of social occupa-
tions to the past, “the historic development of man is recapitulated.” Based on his 
scheme, Dewey coordinated specifi c content with each stage. Dewey considered 
his coordinations “tentative” and provided a defensively worded caveat about how 
diffi  cult his work at the Dewey school had been in light of his administrative du-
ties and lack of adequate resources. Nevertheless, he identifi ed the fi rst stage (age 
four to eight) as “characterized by directness of social and personal interests, and 
by promptness of relationship between impressions, ideas and action.” Th e subject 
matter included those objects and activities in the immediate social surroundings 
of the student that could be translated into play, stories, and art. Historical occupa-
tions such as cooking and weaving best fi t these criteria.14
Th e second stage (age eight to twelve) included a “growing sense of the pos-
sibility of more permanent and objective results and of the necessity for the control 
of agencies for the skill necessary to reach these results.” Dewey found that social 
processes of American history best matched with the characteristics of this stage. 
In this epoch students acquired the use of letters and numbers as “the tools which 
society has evolved in the past” and “the keys which will unlock to the child the 
wealth of social capital which lies beyond the possible range of his limited indi-
vidual experience.” Th is was the stage that most schools had gotten wrong. Dewey 
insisted that without an intrinsic appreciation of the symbolic systems (i.e., numbers 
for mathematics, letters for literacy, maps for geography) and their historical and 
present use, all future abstract study would be disconnected and dull. Th erefore, 
the ultimate goal of stage two was to convince the child that he did not need to be 
a passive recipient of others’ knowledge, he had “the power or skill which he can 
now go ahead and use independently.”15
Th e third stage, according to Dewey, was characterized by mastery of “the 
methods, the tools of thought, inquiry, and activity, appropriate to various phases of 
experience, to be able to specialize upon distinctive studies.” Regarding this stage, 
Dewey related how in 1899, when School and Society was fi rst published, his school 
had not “been in existence long enough so that any typical inferences [could] be 
safely drawn.”16 However, by 1906 Dewey school teacher, Laura Runyon, had worked 
out much of the curriculum for this third stage. In her masters thesis, Runyon pro-
vided a rich description of the history curriculum for these older students of “the 
refl ective age.” Th e students at the Dewey school were led through the social life of 
the Jamestown settlement, the life of John Smith, the development of law and gov-
ernment, the settlement of New England, fur trading, the Revolution, and westward 
expansion. She described the Dewey school approach in the following way: “[the 
student] is studying the life of a people, the problems they had to face, and how they 
succeeded. He constantly contrasts the past with his own present life, and so gets 
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a deeper understanding of the present. He fi nds the meaning for much of his pres-
ent life in the past and, hence is constantly reading into his daily life the new value 
derived from his study.”17 Although “the refl ective-age” students were essentially 
covering the same content of traditional schools, the Dewey school students alleg-
edly gained greater appreciation and value from the historical content because they 
had the stage-appropriate learning of previous years as a foundation. Th roughout 
the progression through these stages, the goal of the teacher, Dewey insisted, was 
to “protect the spirit of inquiry, to keep alive the sacred spark of wonder and the 
fan the fl ame that already glows.”18
In an essay titled “Mental Development,” Dewey briefl y outlined the fourth 
stage of development—adolescence or youth—which extended to age twenty-four. 
Th is last stage, Dewey explained, marked “the epoch of securing the fi nal adjust-
ment on the part of the individual of himself to the fundamental features of life.” 
Students at this stage fully appreciate the social inheritance of the race and sought 
to contribute to it in some way. “In history,” Dewey explained, “the tendency at this 
time is to see larger wholes, to try to gather together facts otherwise scattered and 
to mass them as parts in the comprehensive whole.”19 Th us, students seek to bring 
order to the overwhelming mass of facts the world presents. Th is was the stage of 
the historian. Students and adults at this level learned how to construct new knowl-
edge for the sake of learning and growth.
 Th e objective of this section was not so much to outline the specifi cs of each 
stage, but rather to demonstrate that Dewey was a genetic psychologist. Although 
this term would later be associated with Jean Piaget, Dewey subscribed to the be-
liefs that humans progressed through observable sequential stages of conscious-
ness, that each stage emerged as an inherited impulse further subordinated by the 
physical and social environment, that each stage incorporated the prior stage, and 
that each stage corresponded with the social development of the race. As Dewey 
explained, “For in the truly genetic method, the idea of genesis looks both ways; 
this fact is itself generated out of certain conditions, and in turn tends to gener-
ate something else.”20 In the next section, I will argue that the historical inquiry of 
professional historians described in Logic, is best understood as the fourth stage of 
development, which is the construction of knowledge to be used by others.  Th us, 
the impulse of curiosity becomes more socialized as it enters the fourth stage of 
“consciousness of calling or function.”
Dewey on the Historical Method 
Dewey’s overall view of history was outlined in Reconstruction in Philosophy, one of 
his most accessible works. Even though the essays are only tangentially about histori-
cal form, it is the book with the most historical content in it. In the fi rst two chap-
ters, Dewey traced the interrelationships between the changing social, industrial, 
and intellectual currents of the past, thus historicizing them in their own periods. 
Th e great thinkers and their fi ndings, he argued, were products of the social context 
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that produced them. Philosophy had always evolved as the social and intellectual 
conditions changed in light of innovation. Positivism, idealism, and empiricism 
were all appropriate, even ingenious, philosophies at the times in which they were 
constructed, but they were no longer appropriate in light of the current situation. 
Dewey’s main objective in this work was to free man from the philosophical habit 
of viewing things as being fi xed, essential, or static. “A philosophic reconstruction 
which should relieve men of having to choose between an impoverished and trun-
cated experience on one hand and an artifi cial and impotent reason on the other,” 
Dewey concluded, “would relive human eff ort from the heaviest intellectual burden 
it has to carry.”21 Reconstruction of philosophy, for Dewey, would include the accep-
tance of the contingent, evolving nature of knowledge refl ected at the fourth stage.
 Th us, for both the historicist and genetic elements of Dewey’s thought, history 
was the key to appreciating the nature of any issue or content. As Dewey explained, 
“History sets forth the temporal background, the evolution of the gradual control 
of the activities by which mankind had enriched and perfected its experience.”22  In 
Logic, Dewey again reasserted his beliefs about the circuitous, contingent nature of 
historical knowledge. “Th e fact that history as inquiry which issues in reconstruc-
tion of the past is itself a part of what happens historically,” Dewey insisted, “is an 
important factor in giving history a double meaning.” As outlined above, for Dewey 
history has both a form and content element, which each evolved over time in rela-
tion to one another. As the discipline of history (form) became more rigorous, the 
fi ndings of the historical method (content) became more nuanced. Th erefore, history 
is both “that which happened in the past and it is the intellectual reconstruction of 
these happenings at a subsequent time.” As Dewey argued, the writing of history 
“is itself a historical event.”23  Not only had the method of historical writing evolved 
in the past, but it was destined to evolve in the future as well.
 Dewey did not limit his description of stage-four historical thinking to what 
historians did. He outlined three distinct types of historical thinking: personal rec-
ollection, those events that did not fall under personal recollection, and narrative 
accounts of historians. He addressed each in turn, presumably because to many 
these historical forms moved along a continuum of greater and greater validity 
from personal testimony to collective memory to historical construction.  Dewey’s 
fi rst step was to dispel the notion that personal memory as a form of experience was 
inherently any more accurate than the other forms. Memory, like all knowledge, 
was contingent. Dewey insisted that the affi  rmation of a personal recollection still 
had to extend beyond the individual’s experience to achieve its meaning because 
its affi  rmation had to make reference to a temporal and spatial context from which 
it emerged. “For the point that every temporal proposition is a narrative proposi-
tion,” he explained, “means that the proposition is about a course of sequential 
events, not about an isolated event at an absolute point in time.”24 Th at is, every 
recollection was part of a larger temporal sequence that framed it and a broader 
social context that gave it meaning and made it something to recollect. On the other 
hand, historical judgments outside of recollection, Dewey continued, are not rela-
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tive to the time and space in which they occurred, instead they are “mediated by 
conceptions drawn from prior experience” derived from the social inheritance of 
the race. Th us, Dewey dismissed the pure validity of both personal and collective 
memory as a means of representing the past because both forms were relational to 
previous knowledge and context—a position fully consistent with his historicism. 
All facts had to be related to other facts, nothing could be considered in isolation.
 Regarding the third kind of historical thinking, judgments of historians, 
Dewey was more specifi c and critical. Since history could not be fully and thor-
oughly represented, choices had to be made by the historian. “Like all data they 
[historical judgments] are selected and weighed with reference to their capacity to 
fulfi ll the demands that are imposed by the evidential function,” Dewey insisted, 
“All historical construction is necessarily selective.”25 Dewey argued that there were 
three specifi c ways in which historical constructions were selective.  First, the his-
torical actors make conscious and unconscious selections about what artifacts and 
documents to preserve. Th e entire past is not available en masse, only those por-
tions that were in some way preserved or made to be accessible. For example, my 
depiction of Dewey’s thought on the historical method is already shaped by what 
topics he chose to write about in letters and professional papers. Any thoughts and 
conversations Dewey had that may have been relevant to my inquiry, but were not 
recorded, are lost forever.
Second, the historian was selective in his choice of topic, approach, and pe-
riodization. As Dewey explained, no historical facts belong solely to one approach: 
“Th ere is no event which ever happened that was merely dynastic, merely scientifi c 
or merely technological.” Th e facts themselves did not reveal when to begin or end 
an event or period, or what was or was not signifi cant to it. Again, my choice to 
write about Dewey’s relationship to history and the historical method (as opposed 
to, say, moral education or logical thinking) has guided the sources at which I have 
chosen to look. Th is form of selection takes place before actual historical research 
even begins. On the other hand, the third form of selection occurs during and aft er 
historical inquiry; it is the choice of what facts to include in a narrative and how 
to relate them to one another. “Probably nowhere else is the work of judgment in 
discrimination and in creation of synthesis as marked,” Dewey insisted, “as in his-
torical evocations.”26 Historians rip facts from the textual and temporal contexts 
from which they emerge and place them in a new narrative context of their cre-
ation. For instance, I have represented Dewey’s 20-page chapter on the historical 
method in only a few paragraphs and with only a handful of direct quotations. Th is 
process, Dewey pointed out, includes a great degree of judgment and discrimina-
tion on the part of historian—a process that, for the most part, is never explicitly 
stated by historians.
 Dewey’s description of stage-four historical thinking could be taken two 
ways. Either it was an appreciation of the tortuous and diffi  cult task performed 
by professional historians in the writing of history, or it was a direct attack on the 
claims of objectivity being put forth by many scholars in the fi eld. Perhaps the most 
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provocative accusation issued by Dewey in Logic was: “Th e notion that historical 
inquiry simply reinstates the events that once happened ‘as they actually happened’ 
is incredibly naïve.” Th is was the position that incited the objections of historian 
Chester McArthur Destler, who wrote a critique of Dewey’s pragmatic approach to 
history for the American Historical Review in 1950.
The Destler Aff air
Dewey’s pragmatism was developed in the 1890s and 1900s during what Alan Ryan 
called the high tide of American liberalism.27 However, by the 1950s the tide had 
receded.  Th e most relevant new context for Dewey’s ideas was the Cold War, a 
time when many politicians and theorists were hesitant to adopt anything short of 
absolute, transcendent faith in the principles of American democracy.  Americans 
no longer defi ned themselves as the frontier of progress, but rather as the preserv-
ers of democratic principles and rights. Th ey defi ned themselves against Commu-
nism, a term which, aft er the Second World War, had been confl ated with Nazism 
into the broader notion of totalitarianism. What both Nazis and Communists 
had in common was their use of a singular, state-sponsored history as a means of 
constructing and justifying the reforms of the current regime. Under totalitarian 
governments, historical inquiry was not open-ended. Instead it was dictated by the 
needs of state. As a result, truth was subjugated to the needs of the present. Despite 
Dewey’s repeated assertions of the importance of democratic means, not just ends, 
many such as Chester McArthur Destler thought that the totalitarian approach to 
history sounded too much like Dewey’s pragmatic approach to history.  Destler 
found Dewey’s approach inappropriate and even dangerous in the postwar world.
 Accordingly, in his 1950 article, “Some Observations on Contemporary His-
torical Th eory,” Destler pointed his attack directly at Dewey and his like-minded 
colleagues. Destler insisted that American relativists like Dewey “have neglected 
to indicate to prospective converts the intimate relation that the new Continental 
historiography ha[d] borne to the origins of fascism.” As Destler explained, “the 
adoption of subjectivist-presentist-relativism as the basis of historical theory con-
tributed to the rise of Fascism and Nazism and their conquest of the universities.” 
As a result of Dewey’s approach to history, Clio had been tuned into an instrument 
of propaganda. Destler traced this presentist approach to history, not to only to 
Dewey, but also to Carl Becker, Charles Beard, R. C. Collingwood, and Benedetto 
Croce—the Italian theorist, who according to Destler was, “abysmally and contemp-
tuously ignorant of modern science.” For Destler, these theorists had essentially 
cognitivized history by turning it into something that exists only in the heads of 
historians; they had turned history from something about which historians think 
into something that was nothing more than thought itself. Destler insisted that if 
history were to remain less than a tool for the state, it needed to be based on the 
scientifi c method and accept objectivity as it major goal. Destler declared that in 
Logic, “a major source relied upon by the new historiographers,” Dewey outlined 
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his position that history was unavoidably and inherently permeated with the needs 
and thoughts of the present.28  
Th e Destler essay was intentionally provocative. Guy Stanton Ford, the editor 
of the American Historical Review, allegedly admitted that the Destler piece was 
“rotten” but he hoped that it would spark a debate about the philosophy and logic 
of history.29 Before he even read it, Dewey’s initial response to Destler’s attack was 
to link it to Cold War irrationality. “Th ere is of course a general wave of attack on 
every form of relationalism now,” Dewey remarked to Merle Curti, “[a] not so in-
telligent way of meeting the Bolshevist absolutist brand, I suppose.”30 In letters to 
four of his colleagues about the Destler essay, Dewey quipped that, “McCarthyism 
isn’t confi ned to politics.”31  Beyond this initial response, Dewey was “quite literally 
fl abbergasted—both at the philosophical position attributed me and his account of 
my supposed infl uence over historical writers.”32 As time passed, he became more 
and more disturbed by Destler’s accusations and sent notes responding to Destler’s 
essay to several of his colleagues, including Curti, Harold Taylor, and Joseph Rat-
ner.  Dewey denied that he was telling historians how to do their job. Instead, he 
explained, “I take for granted the works of historians and attempt to set forth its 
implications for logic as concerned with a theory of knowing as when knowing is 
treated as [an] existing and observable body of knowledge.”33  Dewey insisted that 
he was ignorant of Croce’s views on history, and that he doubted the infl uence of 
Croce on Carl Becker, Charles Beard, and the new historians. “Unless the validity 
of his attribution of Croce’s infl uence on Bread & Becker can be made out,” Dewey 
wrote, “his whole essay is convicted of sloppy unhistorical writing—badly stated 
dishonesty.”  Dewey regarded Destler’s depiction of his views as a caricature and 
concluded: “All the evidence shows that D has never even read Chapter XII [of 
Logic].”34 Indeed, Destler’s footnotes demonstrated that he had cited Dewey sec-
ond- and third-hand; he did not engage with the primary texts of Dewey or most 
of his other targets.
 Aft er reading the Destler attack, Harold Taylor wrote Dewey that the essay 
was “beneath contempt and is merely a bad joke on the editors.”  He assured Dewey 
that “anyone with half a brain who reads the piece will recognize it as an uninformed 
and ignorant person, and most of us do not think of his attack as being of any con-
sequence.” He asked Dewey for permission to “do something about it.”35  Over the 
next few months, in consultation with Dewey, Taylor, Curti, and Randall worked a 
rebuttal to the Destler essay. At this time, Dewey was elderly and making frequent 
trips to the hospital, and so his colleagues took the Destler attack personally. Early 
draft s of the rebuttal were long and angry, but aft er several revisions, they decided 
on a shorter piece that merely corrected the errors made by Destler. Th e letter to 
the editor of the American Historical Review, signed by Merle Curti, Bert James 
Loewenberg, John Herman Randall, Jr. and Harold Taylor, was published in January 
1951. Th e letter describing Dewey’s philosophical views on history refl ected a clar-
ity and brevity of which Dewey was incapable. It represented, perhaps, the clearest 
statement of Dewey’s views on history and the historical method.
E&C   Education and Culture
30    Thomas D. Fallace
 Th e authors asserted that Destler had misrepresented the ideas of Beard and 
Becker, but in the case of Dewey, Destler had distorted his philosophy “beyond 
recognition, either by its author or by any informed philosopher.”36 Th ey insisted 
that Dewey’s position was simple: historical facts gain their meaning from the way 
they are used by historians. Th is did not mean that these facts did not exist inde-
pendent of historians. Th is was somewhat of a misrepresentation of Dewey’s actual 
position, because in Logic Dewey had deliberately avoided use of the term “fact,” 
using “judgment” instead, a choice that had created much of the confusion. Nev-
ertheless, Dewey’s colleagues insisted that Dewey “was not a subjectivist.”37 In fact, 
they pointed out, on numerous occasions, Dewey had specifi cally written against 
the purely subjectivist position.
 Dewey’s theory of knowledge, the letter explained, substitutes “ideas” for 
subjectivist mental states; these ideas are “are psychical data, capable of being ob-
served, since they exist spatially and temporally. Th ey are not the sole property of 
a subject, nor do they ‘represent’ objects.” Th ese ideas are not transcendent; they 
are themselves historical events. Th e inappropriate use of relativism by Destler, 
the authors asserted, “is used as a condemnation, rather than a description of Mr. 
Dewey’s views. . . . His relativism is not temporal it is logical.” Dewey did not be-
lieve that history is merely a set of symbols in the historian’s mind, but instead 
contended that the logical organization of the past into a narrative is an event that 
takes place in the historian’s mind as she or he subordinates it for social use. Dewey 
pointed this out, not to deny the goal of objectivity, but instead to aid historians 
in their attempt to achieve greater clarity and consistency. “He is of course aware 
of the historians’ biases,” Dewey’s colleagues insisted,  “but it is to achieve greater 
objectivity, not to subvert it, that he cautions us to be aware of them.”38 Ultimately, 
according to Dewey’s colleagues, Dewey’s position could be summarized with three 
basic assertions. Historical knowledge is most useful when it provides insight into 
a current problem, history is always written from a present point of view, and all 
knowledge, including historical knowledge, is contingent.
Despite the sloppiness of Destler’s argument, it was Dewey’s second asser-
tion—that history is always written from the present point of view—with which 
Destler had the biggest issue. However, the letter by Dewey’s colleagues never fully 
addressed it. Destler, along with subsequent critics of Dewey, insisted that histori-
cal inquiries could take place for the sake of the past without any implicit links to 
the present. History could be purely descriptive; it was not always driven by a pres-
ent problem. In Logic, Dewey was unclear about whether or not he was referring 
to a historiographical problem or a social one.  Th is was because, to Dewey, social 
and historiographical problems were circuitously intertwined.  Historical form and 
content evolved together in relation to their contexts.39
In his discussion of the Destler article, Dewey repeatedly mentioned how 
disappointed he was that the American Historical Review, the top journal in the 
fi eld, published Destler’s article.  Dewey had always been attacked by ideologues 
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who objected to his ideas, but what concerned him so much was that the process 
of peer-review—perhaps the greatest achievement of the professionalization of the 
disciplines—seemed to be breaking down. Dragons, which he believed had already 
been slain, were reappearing. “I’ve seen resort to philosophical controversies in the 
case of second and third class writers,” he confessed to Curti, “but . . . I am surprised 
to fi nd [it] in a serious historical review.” Dewey wondered, had Destler written a 
critique of Einstein’s theory of relativity, would the Journal of Physics accept and 
publish it? As he expressed to Harold Taylor, Dewey was disturbed less by “Destler’s 
fantasy” than he was by “the fact that a reputable organ would publish it & oth-
ers be disturbed by it.”40 Dewey’s disgust with the poor judgment of the American 
Historical Review, which, according to Dewey, had given “a quasi-endorsement to 
the article,” was preempted by the publication of an equally disturbing article on 
his views the year before. In Th e Journal of Philosophy, Mary Brodbeck argued that 
Dewey’s instrumentalism was inherently idealistic and could not shake the rem-
nants of rationalism.41  Th e publication of Destler’s essay, Dewey remarked to Ar-
thur Bentley, “made Brebeck & the editors of the Jn of Philosophy, look . . . respect-
able.”42  To Harold Taylor, Dewey added: “Th e more I read the Destler Article the 
worse it shows up. As with the Brodbeck article, I blame the editors more than the 
writers.”43 Dewey favored the proposal of new ideas, even bad ones, but he counted 
on the social and intellectual feedback of peers to sort, mold, and correct them. 
Th e Brodbeck and Destler essays concerned him about the effi  cacy of this process.
Dewey was obviously worried about the legacy of his ideas and that of the 
logical methods he so arduously supported. In 1950 Dewey was at the very end of 
his career; he passed away two years later. While Dewey had withstood attacks 
throughout his career, he had generally witnessed a gradual acceptance of his view 
by many leading scholars and intellectuals. By 1950 this trend seemed to be revers-
ing. Dewey, so attuned to the changing conditions of the day, perhaps predicted an 
inevitable backlash against instrumentalism aft er his passing.  Th e Destler aff air 
not only represented Dewey’s fi nal eff ort to clear his name and clarify his position, 
but it demonstrated the intensity of the devotion of his friends and their willing-
ness to come to his aid.
Was Dewey Antagonistic to History? 
So was Dewey antagonistic to or ambivalent about history? Not really. Th e past 
was absolutely central to Dewey’s philosophy. He envisioned history in historicist 
terms, as form and content in continuous and coordinated growth. Th e discipline 
of history as practiced by professional historians was the latest and most advanced 
form of history, but not the only or even necessarily ideal way to approach the sub-
ject.  Unlike Destler, Dewey was not interested in issues of whether higher stage 
forms of history produced greater validity and accuracy than prior stages, because 
such a discussion presumed a dualistic positivistic outlook that his instrumental-
ism rejected. Th e primary objective of Logic was to describe how the professional 
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historian went about creating and warranting his assertions. It was a descriptive 
approach, not necessarily a prescriptive one. He wanted to make explicit a logic 
that was implicit in the historical method. In Logic Dewey was describing history 
at fourth-level consciousness, but Destler wanted to bring the discipline back to 
third-order consciousness—to a world of determining static truths. Th e logic of 
history was warranted only in how it related to the present level of consciousness, 
which was always in a state of continuous growth.
Th e other major disagreement with Destler was Dewey’s refusal to separate 
historical form from historical content. For Destler, form, which was solely in the 
head of the historian, was applied to the content of the past, which was distinct 
and separate. Dewey, on the other hand, viewed the two as circuitous; they could 
not be separated at any stage. According to Destler, the better a historian got at the 
form of the professional historian, the more accurate she or he got at portraying 
the content of the past. In contrast, Dewey avoided any reference to accuracy or 
validity. Instead he viewed each stage as a more nuanced, socialized, and democrati-
cally informed consciousness. Each stage incorporated the prior one. History was 
a series of stages that recapitulated the evolution of the race, and it would continue 
to evolve as such in the future. “History cannot escape its own process,” Dewey 
argued, “It will, therefore, always be rewritten.”44 As we now know, the onset of 
critical theory, feminism, multiculturalism, and postmodernism—manifestations 
of fi ft h-order consciousness—during the second half of the twentieth century has 
proved Dewey correct in this prediction.
In fact, references to “the postmodernist turn” have led some curriculum 
theorists to cite Dewey as a rationale for more inquiry-based learning in history 
education because the idea of “historical facts” seems outdated in the postmodern 
world. However, Dewey would not have supported introducing postmodernist 
methods or content to students in the elementary and secondary schools because he 
fi rst wanted students to master the content and form of traditionalist and modern-
ist approaches to history before they engaged in postmodernist ones. “Th e mind at 
every stage of growth has its own logic,” Dewey insisted in 1933 in his revised ver-
sion of How We Th ink, “Th e only way in which a person can reach ability to make 
accurate defi nitions, penetrating classifi cations, and comprehensive generalizations 
is by thinking alertly and carefully at his own present level.”45 Both the positivism 
of Destler and the postmodernism of contemporary critics are just stages of social 
and individual growth that can subsumed within Dewey’s overall historicist and 
genetic psychological scheme. Above all else, for Dewey, history education needs 
to be developmentally appropriate.
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29. Ford is quoted second hand by Harold Taylor in a letter to Dewey, 26 October 1950 
(record 12308) in Correspondence.   
30. Dewey to Merle Curti, 11 May 1950, (record 13795) in Correspondence.
31. See Dewey to Merle Curti, 12 June 1950 (record 1394) and John Dewey to Harold 
Taylor, 14 June, 1950 (record 14259), John Dewey to Lyle K. Eddy, 15 June 1950 (record 
14710), John Dewey to Arthur Bentley 19 June 1950 (record 15868) in Correspondence.   
32. Dewey to Merle Curti, 12 June 1950 (record 1394) in Correspondence.
33. Dewey to Merle Curti, n.d. June 1950 (record 14002) in Correspondence.  
34. Dewey to Merle Curti, 7 June 1950 (record 14001) in Correspondence.  
35. Harold Taylor to Dewey, 20 June 1950 (record 12119) and Taylor to JD, 5 July 1950 
(record 12155) in Correspondence.
36. Curti, Loewenberg,  Randall, and Taylor, “Communications,” 450.  
E&C   Education and Culture
34    Thomas D. Fallace
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 451.
39. Th e evolution of the form and content of the historical method has been well-docu-
mented. See Novick, “Th at Noble Dream” and Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century. 
40. Dewey to Harold Taylor, 14 June 1950 (record 14259) in Correspondence. 
41. Brodbeck, “Th e New Rationalism.” 
42. Dewey to Arthur Bentley, 19 June 1950 (record 15868) in Correspondence.
43. Dewey to Harold Taylor 28 June 1950 (record 14261) in Correspondence.  
44. Dewey, “Logic,” 238.
45. Dewey, “Why Refl ective Th inking,” 213, 214.  
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